Husserl's Phenomenology (Ferrara, Ch. 3)

Summary:
Edmund Husserl sough to create a new phenomenological foundation to provide philosophy and science with a methodology based on absolutely verifiable foundations of immediate conscious experience. He believed that systematic descriptions "purify" the object engaged by consciousness of all constructive interpretations. He asserted that one must suspend belief in theories, concepts, and symbols in order to perceive what is directly given. By bracketing out biases and focusing solely on an object's essential elements rather than trying to analyze an object by trying to fit it in with pre-conceptions, we move back to the things themselves and will be better able to understand them or discern meaning, or as Ferrara puts it, "solves the problem of the disjunction between realism and idealism." Ferrara explains that consciousness is constituted through the form of inner flow of time. We experience things through time by using retention and protention. Husserl believes that all past and future stems from the present, and that objects have consistent self-identity because they inhere physical consistency and protentions are continuously being consummated in consciousness that are in agreement with past retentions. Ferrara compares retentions and protentions in music to watching a comet. One can see where the comet has been by observing the vector of it's tail, and based on that progression (retention), one can predict where it will move next (protention), but all of this stems from the conscious perception of where the comet itself is now. Miller confirms this by stating that one tones in succession but aways in the context of the whole melody. Husserl claims that perception is the ultimate empirical tool and that the immediacy of perception is the ultimate foundation of knowledge.

Husserl's phenomenology consists of a two-part reduction. The first stage is transcendental reduction, which involves a shift from ordinary perception to phenomenological perception. This means that one suspends his "natural attitude," or mode of orientation grounded in pre-dispositions to things, and turns inward toward consciousness. One examines his own consciousness and thereby is able to see the object as it is in consciousness. This mode of consciousness is called the transcendental ego. The second stage is eidetic reduction, which moves toward the object's essence. Transcendental reduction reveals the object's structures and eidetic reduction reveals which of those structures are essential and which can be suspended without destroying the object. This is accomplished by imagining the object without some of it's properties. Those characteristics that do not change when consciousness changes are essential.

Husserl's phenomenology was rejected by many because of its apparent solipsism. Because his later theories became more and more focused on the consciousness of the analyst, there were problems when trying to account for "the Other," or other egos. To rebut the accusation of solipsism, Husserl introduced the concept of Lebenswelt, defined by Ferrara as "an intersubjective community of 'my' and 'other' egos." In one of his later works In Crisis, Husserl explains that the achievements of individuals in a community are collectivized by the culture to shape the Lebenswelt, or life-world and the life-world informs the individuals. He claims that the life-world prior to science, and therefore immediate perception in phenomenology is the basis for scientific objectivity.

Ultimately, Ferrara concludes, Husserl fails to construct a rigorous science of phenomenology because bracketing out the ego forces one to lose the sense of being in the world. This is because a) the idea of the transcendental ego is God-like, and b) language is too biased to articulate his real point.

Reaction:
I think that Husserl's phenomenology does fail as a rigorous science, but I don't agree with Ferrara's reasons for this. I think that the transcendental ego is not God-like but rather humble. The only thing that would make it God-like would be if the analyst were imposing his or her biases on the object, which is precisely what the transcendental ego is avoiding. Furthermore, the idea of Lebenswelt should silence any remaining arguments of solipsism. As was discussed in the previous chapter, "man can only understand from the standpoint of his time and cultural place," which can and should be extended to mean that an individual can only understand from his own individual standpoint. Because he is part of his life-world, he is able to draw on the collective knowledge and achievements of "other egos" of his life-world and does so automatically by virtue of his humanity.
I also disagree with Ferrara's assertion that language is too biased to articulate his real point. I think that his point is extremely clear. I think that people are too biased to allow language to articulate his real point. This is a problem that can be solved by simply using the phenomenology. One has to let go of his pre-conceived notions about what certain words such as "transcendental" and "ego" connotate and perceive them as they appear temporally in consciousness in the context of the whole theory.